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Forest economics and policy
 
B. M. H. Sharp and B. B. Hull 
ABSTRACT 
The'economics of deriving raw materials from forests is 
,examined. Competitive markets are consistent with the 
notion of efficiency, although they may not produce 
results that are fair. Sustainability as an alternative crite­
rion suffers from problems of commensurability and an 
inability to identify preferred options when a choice 
between alternative patterns of use is possible. Given a 
choice among a number of sustainable use rates, com­
petitive markets satisfy both criteria. Institutional arran­
gements are significant variables in forestry policy 
because they provide a basis for competitive markets and 
they determine the distribution ofbenefits and costs asso­
ciated with use. 
INTRODUCTION 
The rate at which many of New Zealand's forest resources are 
being used is a topic of public debate. Some claim contempo­
rary use rates are not sustainable. Others express concern that 
products derived from quality indigenous trees are being 
wasted. Public debate has also focused on non-market benefits 
and costs. Forests provide habitat for wildlife and contribute to 
soil and water conservation. Harvesting trees can result in off­
site impacts such as increased siltation of rivers, estuaries, and 
harbours. Some forests have social and cultural values. 
Expression of these concerns by conservation and preserva­
tion organizations contributed to a decision to separate the 
conservation and production functions of the New Zealand 
Forest Service. The Treasury argued that the objectives of con­
servation and production were better served by separating the 
functions of management agencies. The new Forestry Corpo­
ration is expected to operate on a commercial basis, and the 
Department of Conservation is responsible for natural 
resource conservation. 
Our aim is to consider the economic aspects of using a 
renewable resource to supply forest industries with raw mate­
rials. Clearly this supply is provided by a collection of private 
individuals and firms including the New Zealand Forestry Cor­
poration. It involves a range of institutional arrangements and 
includes public and private systems of ownership. Actions by 
this collection of public agencies, private firms, and individuals 
will result in patterns of forest use that vary across regions and 
over time. 
We do not dispute the biological bounds placed on the 
notion of renewability. However, to the extent that many 
future use patterns are possible, determining a given use rate 
becomes significant. Economic analysis can help solve the 
problem of determining use rates. Our aim is to introduce and 
discuss concepts relevant to an evaluation of options for 
sustainable forest use. 
The approach in this paper is limited, intentionally so. We 
do not consider off-site and non-market costs and benefits, nor 
do we attempt empirical analysis. We intend only to provide a 
basic background and to outline the significant issues in evalua-
The authors: Basil Sharp is senior lecturer in resource economics at the 
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ting New Zealand forest resource policy. Such an approach
 
lays important groundwork for analysis of specific forest
 






A complete characterization of the actors in the forestry sector
 
includes the Crown, private resource owners, the public agen­

cies and private firms which use the raw material, and con­

sumers of the final products (national and international). To
 
simplify the dis~ussion, we use a very simple relationship that
 
might exist between a collection of individuals and firms grow­

ing trees and a number of sawmills requiring raw materials.
 
Demand for Raw Materials
 
People purchase housing, furniture, books, and newspapers;
 
all products which use raw materials obtained from forests.
 
Consumer willingness to pay for these finished products is sum­

marized by market demand, a relationship between price and
 
quantity demanded. It is not unreasonable to expect quantity
 
demanded to increase as price falls. In addition, demand for a
 
product can change with changes in income, changes in the
 
price of related goods, and changes in consumer tastes. For
 
example, the national demand for furniture made of kauri
 




Demand by mills for the raw materials of forests is therefore 
a demand derived from consumer demand for final products. 
Consider the demand for logs, which is derived from the 
demand for plywood. To determine derived demand we need 
to know something about demand for the product plywood, 
supply of other inputs used by mills to produce plywood, and 
prices of substitutes to plywood. A particular plywood pro­
ducer's derived demand for logs depends on the price the pro­
ducer receives for plywood and on the cost of obtaining factors 
of production such as labour, energy, and machinery. 
The mill manager's maximum willingness to pay for logs is 
given by the difference between the cost of non-log factors of 
production and the revenues obtained per unit of output. 
Market demand for logs is given by the sum of individual mill 
demands. The essential point is that consumer willingness to 
pay for finished products and the cost of non-log factors of 
production co-determine demand for logs. 
Supply of Raw Materials 
The cost of supplying logs reflects the cost of obtaining the 
right to harvest trees and the cost of harvesting the trees and 
transporting logs to the mill. Variations in forest owner willing­
ness to sell are the result of differences in owner objectives for 
forest management. Owners are likely to delay selling their 
trees if they expect real stumpage prices to rise sufficiently in 
the future. Some owners attach positive non-market values to 
their forests, such as those associated with wildlife, and tend to 
be less interested in selling. Other owners are only concerned 
about immediate market value of the forest's logs. 
Variations in owner willingness to sell cause supply costs to 
increase with the quantity of logs. The more logs mills wish to 
purchase, the more the mills must pay per log, since mills must 
buy logs from owners who attach successively higher value to 
their forests. A supply schedule expresses this relationship by 
describing the quantity of logs suppliers are willing to sell at 
various prices. The supply schedule slopes upward, reflecting 
the increasing cost of obtaining additional logs. 
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Equilibrium 
Markets depend upon, and operate within, a set of institu­
tional arrangements. Those holding rights to the forest's raw 
materials are willing to relinquish these rights at various prices. 
Buyers are willing to buy logs at prices reflecting their cost of 
production and consumer demand for final products. Market 
equilibrium price is the outcome of a bargaining process 
between these sellers and buyers. The price tends to move 
toward the point where the quantity of logs forest owners are 
willing to sell equals the quantity mills are willing to buy. 
Prices in our economic system derive from markets and we 
typically rely on this mechanism to provide relative values that 
guide resource allocation and the distribution of goods and ser­
vices. One of the attractions of competitive markets is that this 
interaction between willing buyer and willing seller can result 
in maximum net social benefits, given the existing distribution 
of income. 
Efficiency is the most commonly used criterion in economic 
analyses of resource allocation. In competitive markets, equili­
brium price and quantity exchanged is described as being 
efficient. The outcome is efficient because market price is the 
mill's willingness to pay for the "last log" and is also the cost of 
obtaining rights to use that log. Price equals marginal cost. At 
a higher output, the cost of an additional log exceeds its value 
to buyers. At a lower output, some potential gains are fore­
gone, since some logs whose value exceeds cost are not 
exchanged. 
A requirenlent for efficient operation of the market mecha­
nism is that participants are able to control and transfer rights 
to property. The set of forest property rights prior to the reor­
ganization of the Forest Service is quite different from that 
existing today. Under the new organizational structure, raw 
materials produced from state-owned forests gravitate to 
buyers willing to pay for the full costs of supply. Those pre­
viously enjoying a subsidy now have to pay competitive prices. 
Consumers not previously enjoying access to a competitive 
supply of raw materials now have an opportunity to benefit 
from competitive conditions. Establishing a system of property 
rights conducive to market efficiency also carries with it a 
change in the distribution of benefits and costs. 
The bargaining process is complicated by concentrations of 
market power and legal agreements that compromise smooth 
operation of the market. Large buyers of raw materials might 
be able to negotiate supply contracts with small forest owners 
at lower than competitive prices. Long-term stumpage con­
tracts might have clauses which artificially distort prices. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that markets are characterized by 
competition where a relatively large number of mills compete 
to purchase from a relatively large number of forest owners, 
the nlarket produces results which maximize net benefit. 
Welfare Economics 
Almost without exception, the great works of economics have 
gone beyond the description and analysis of the workings of 
the economic system. Appraisal and evaluation of approaches 
to organizing our econonlic system and managing natural 
resources falls within the domain of welfare economics, the 
term for the normative branch of economics. The applied wel­
fare economist is therefore interested in determining if intro­
duction of a specific policy, project, or management regime 
makes people better off than the alternatives. 
In economics, it is assumed that society's well-being is made 
up of the well-being of individuals in the society. 
The individual is the originator of preference and therefore 
value. It is basically utilitarian in its ethical stance (Olafson, 
1973). The propriety of this ethical stance has been examined 
by philosophers and economists (Rawls, 1971; Page, 1977). 
The problem of deriving operational indicators of welfare 
has confronted economists for over one hundred years. The 
essence of the problem is how to measure individual welfare, 
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how to add up these preferences, and how to compare the 
aggregates. In the case of raw materials obtained from forests, 
we can use prices as a measure of the value derived from use. 
Consumers and firms compare the benefits and costs of use, 
exchanges are made in the market, and we observe prices 
which reflect the trade-offs made. Prices and other monetary 
measures provide indicators of value in a market (Just et al., 
1982). The appropriateness of using these measures for public 
policy analysis depends upon the context and held values upon 
which market decisions are made (Brown, 1984). 
TIME 
Time is important because of uncertainty over the ultimate 
impacts of current decisions, particularly as they relate to the 
management of renewable resources. Time also matters 
because the present generation can influence the resource 
endowment future generations inherit. Just how contempor­
ary actions affect future generations depends on techno.logical 
change, the availability of substitutes, and future preferences. 
Discounting 
Growing trees to supply raw material necessarily involves long 
time periods. A kauri forest nlight take 80 years to reach 
harvestable age. Even a pine forest might take 25 years to 
reach harvestable age. Because of these long time horizons, 
benefits and costs must be discounted to a common (present) 
time (Barton and Horgan, 1980). We make four observations. 
First, discounting is a method of placing a relative weight on 
future benefits and costs; it is not a procedure for calculating 
future benefits and costs. Future benefits and costs must be 
established first. For example, if we expect the price of kauri 
. products to increase over time, this should be included in the 
projected flow of benefits, not be factored into the discount 
rate itself. 
Second, competitive market discipline requires producers to 
maximize the present value of profits (Samuelson, 1976). If a 
producer fails to do so, and rights to resources are transferable, 
resources gravitate to those firms that do maximize the present 
value of profits. Failure to follow this principle results in inef­
ficiencies; the nation forgoes real wealth. 
Third, the relation between the discount rate and resource 
depletion is ambiguous. It does not necessarily follow that high 
discount rates result in accelerated depletion of a natural 
resource. For example, the rate of change in relative prices and 
poor economic performance of the economy as a whole might 
reduce depletion rates. 
Fourth, the discount rate applies to all future flows of 
benefits and costs; not just "money-valued" transactions. 
Thus, a comprehensive estimate of the cost of forestry rriust 
include an estimate of the value of opportunities foregone by 
using the land for forestry. 
Intertemporal Efficiency 
Present-day managers make decisions that influence future 
flows of benefits and cos~s (Page, 1977). The net present value 
criterion, as used in cost-benefit analysis, is an intertemporal 
version of the efficiency criterion. A project is judged to be 
'worthwhile' if the present value of net benefits is positive. 
Cost-benefit analysis describes and quantifies all advantages 
and disadvantages of a policy, alternative development pro­
jects, or set of management options. Attention is focused on 
estimating return, expressed in terms of net present value, to 
the nation. Barton and Horgan (1980) use this framework to 
evaluate radiata pine and kauri. All inputs - capital, labour, 
land, fertilizer, seedlings - should be included at their opportu­
nity cost to the nation. Benefit estinlates are derived from what 
consumers are willing to pay for the timber products. All 
values are time-dated and are expressed in equivalent units. 
Valuation is particularly difficult for forest investments 
where horizons are commonly longer than 30 years. This dif­
ficulty should not be sidestepped too quickly by appealing to 
the impact that a positive discount rate has on benefit flows far 
in the future. Newman et ale (1985) show that the rate of price 
change, even given discounting and the long production 
period, is important in determining rotation length. 
Distribution 
The efficiency of the present value criterion. is one of its chief 
virtues. However, proposals based on the present value crite­
rion might also turn out to be inconsistent over time. Incon­
sistency follows from the impact that contemporary decisions 
have on future opportunities. One generation using the crite­
rion to select a forest use pattern has an impact on future 
patterns of use. The same criterion followed by the second 
generation provides another plan. Strotz (1955-6) has shown 
that the second generation would want the opportunity to 
revise the forest resource it inherited. This is what Strotz 
referred to as the intertemporal tussle. 
Competitive markets allocate resources efficiently for any 
given distribution of wealth. But markets do not solve the 
problem of what is a fair distribution of wealth among people 
at a point in time or among generations. This observation is 
relevant to forestry because the natural resource has a relati­
vely long production period and decisions are connected over 
time. Forestry planning today has implications that span future 
generations. We cannot rely on market forces ipso facto to pro­
vide the signals necessary for a fair distribution of benefits and 
costs. Income redistribution is properly the function of the cen­
tral government, not the market for logs. 
Uncertainty 
Significant uncertainty characterizes the market for titnber and 
related products. Uncertainty arises from climatic events, 
technological change, changes in legal agreements, changes in . 
the world economy, and so on. Consider the uncertainty that 
surrounds estimates of kauri stand yields and kauri timber 
prices in 80 years. Uncertainty creates difficulty for economic 
analysis because there is no universal price for uncertainty and 
because attitudes to risk and uncertainty vary by circumstance 
and across decision makers. 
Even with the uncertainty of plans with a one-hundred-year 
horizon, Naslund (1977) argues that guaranteeing continuous 
forest production is desirable. More recently, Mills and 
Hoover (1982) use portfolio analysis to examine the proposi­
tion that landowners investing in forestry development seem 
to be making an 'unwise' investment. They found that forest 
investments in combination with other investments, such as 
government bonds, are preferred options. Forestry invest­
ments were found to be fairly risky if held singly, but desirable 
as a means to diversify a portfolio of other assets. 
WHEN TO HARVEST 
Processing industries require a reliable supply of raw mate­
rials. In a competitive market, industries bid for this supply in 
the market. Forest owners base their harvesting decisions on 
expected prices. From the forest owner's point of view, timing 
the timber harvest is a major decision because of the long pro­
duction period involved, the large investments made in plant­
ing and management, and the large expected returns per unit 
area. 
Sustained Yield 
Traditionally, forest managers assert that sustained yield is the 
appropriate management objective. Sustained yield is recom­
mended on the grounds that it protects the resource base for 
the longest possible time. For indigenous forests, Froude et ale 
(1985) define sustainability as: 
. . . harvesting in a manner consi­
stent with the rate and type of nat­
ural replenishment, using 
methods compatible with the 
long-term survival of the forest. 
(p.7) 
The Indigenous Forest Policy adopted by the Government 
in 1975 recognizes the importance of developing logging tech­
niques which ensure sustained timber yield. While many fore­
sters remain confident that sustained yield is feasible, efforts to 
develop suitable techniques are often thwarted by climatic 
conditions, insufficient funds for research, and long-term log­
ging contracts (Nature Conservation Council, 1981). 
There are two difficulties with the notion of sustained yield. 
The first arises when production involves a number of interac­
ting resources. A high level of yield from a given unit of land 
might be sustainable, but only by increasing the use of other 
resources such as fertilizer. Second, it is likely that many levels 
of sustained yield are feasible. The question becomes: which 
sustained yield should be selected? Some advocate a policy of 
maximum sustained yield by following a planting, thinning, 
and cutting cycle that maximizes output of stumpage, averaged 
over many repeated cycles (Samuelson, 1976). The notion of 
















0 G N P Years 
Figure 1: Sustained Yield 
If we ignore the cost of establishing the forest, maximum 
(gross) sustained yield occurs at G. Notice that this does not 
occur at the point of maximum product (P). Waiting the addi­
tional (P-G) years means forgoing greater increments to 
product from growth of younger trees. Of course, there are 
opportunity costs associated with planting, managing, and har­
vesting trees. These costs are shown in Figure 1 as yield for­
gone (BN). They have the effect of increasing the rotation 
yield to N years. Maximum net sustained yield, gross yield less 
opportunity costs, is shown as AB (Samuelson, 1976). 
Optimal Harvesting 
The absence of benefit and cost valuations over time distingu­
ishes the sustained yield criterion from the present value crite­
rion. Economic analysis of optimum harvest date is concerned 
with costs and returns. Three categories of cost are relevant. 
First, there is the input of capital, labour, and materials during 
production. Second, there is an opportunity cost associated 
with the value of the investment. Third, the land locked into 
forestry production has an opportunity cost associated with its 
use. The charge against forest use should be based on the 
highest net return possible from the best alternative use . 
Determining the optimum rotation under sustained rotation 
has received much attention from economists over the years. It 
is not a trivial exercise. In 1849, Faustmann produced a des­
cription of the rotation scheme that emerges in a competitive 
environment. By maximizing net present value over an infinity 
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of cycles, Faustmann shows that the optimal rotation period is 
shorter than that obtained under a policy of maximizing net 
sustained yield. Binkley (1987) shows that economic rotations 
can be greater than, equal to, or less than the rotation which 
maximizes sustained physical output of the forest. 
The rule is summarized as: harvest when 
change in interest on the annual rental 
+ 
stumpage value standing timber value of the land 
Figure 2 illustrates this harvesting rule. The annual change in 
stumpage value is given by DSV, interest on the value of stan­
ding timber is IS, and AV describes the annual rental value of 
the land. Trees are left to grow as long as DSV exceeds 
IS+AV. Optimal harvesting occurs at T*. Notice that the 
maximum value of harvested timber occurs at T'. This is not 
the economic optimum because it ignores the annual costs of 
maintaining the resource (IS+ AV). 
$ 
o 
Figure 2: Optimal Rotation Length 
The above method has the advantage that it easily deals with 
some of the complexities of an ongoing forest operation. The 
forester need not have accurate information about lifetime 
growth rates of trees, since the harvesting decision is made on 
a year-by-year basis based on actual growth. So long as log 
prices, interest rates, and annual rents are changing smoothly, 
the harvesting decision requires little information about the 
future. Once again, the decision to harvest is made each year 
and is based on actual price changes. 
FOREST POLICY 
Public policy researchers are certainly concerned with describ­
ing the effect that individuals, groups, and organizations have 
on decisions by elected and appointed policy-makers. Beyond 
mere description, however, researchers must explain and pre­
dict the consequences of changes in institutional arrange­
ments, particularly changes initiated by Government. We have 
outlined some economic theory useful in understanding the 
consequences of changes in governnlent forestry policy. 
Institutions - laws, administrative procedures, and oper­
ating rules - provide the basis of market transactions. We have 
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already noted the role of property rights, a subset of institu­
tions, in the operation of competitive markets. Formalorgani­
zations such as government agencies, corporations and state­
owned enterprises, are manifestations of specific institutions. 
Each organization has its own set of internal rules and oper­
ating procedures. 
A basis for forest policy is found in the divergence between 
what society expects and the outcomes associated with the 
existing set of institutional arrangements. Public concern over 
performance of the Forest Service led to a change in organiza­
tional structure. The new structure will influence decisions 
made by those operating within the sector. The primary aim of 
institutional change was to set up the conditions conducive to 
efficiency, and we expect to see a change in the level and distri­
bution of benefits and costs associated with forest resource uti­
lization. The attendant distribution of benefits and costs may 
lead to political pressure in the future to further alter institu­
tional structure in the forestry sector. 
Institutional change is one of the most potent policy instru­
ments available. Government policy for economic manage­
ment and the restructuring of the Forest Service is a significant 
change in institutional structure. The effects of this change will 
be seen in the markets for wood products, intertemporal pat­
terns of resource use, profitability of forest investment, and the 
contribution of forestry to national economic growth. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Society must make choices about use of its forest resources. In 
its narrowest sense, economics is concerned with determining 
optimal policy, with the efficiency criterion providing the yard-' 
stick for evaluating the expected performance of forest invest­
ment and changes to forest policy. The criterion does not 
guarantee sustainable supply, nor can it be expected to pro­
duce a "fair" distribution of costs and benefits now or across 
generations. Alternative criteria exist, such as sustained yield, 
which also help shed light on the problem of choice. 
Neither efficiency nor sustainability are sufficient criteria for 
choosing a policy because the probability of adopting a policy 
depends upon the costs and benefits it confers to individuals 
and groups within our society. A better understanding of the 
role of property rights and institutional arrangements, includ­
ing markets, in the allocation of natural resources and the dis­
tribution of the benefits and costs associated with use enhances 
society's chances of using renewable resource in a sustainable 
way. 
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Award to 
commemorate~r INSTITUTE NEWS Ii 
NZIF Council activities 
The full Council met in July, November 
and February and an Executive consis-
ting of the President, Vice-President, 
Secretary and Treasurer have met at 
about monthly intervals. 
The main highlights of the meetings 
have been: 
1. New Zealand's prestigious forestry 
award, the Kirk Horn Flask and Medal, 
will be presented for the first time at the 
Annual General Meeting in May next 
year. 
2. A NZ Forest Service award will be 
instituted based on donations received 
for this purpose. 
3. The implementation of the new 
membership categories has been under-
taken. All affiliate members would auto-
matically become Associate members; 
the election of the first Fellows has 
begun. 
4. An 'Issues Committee' comprising 
Ms Crozier and Messrs Bunn, Cameron, 
and Vaughan has been involved in pre-
paring a number of submissions for the 
Institute. 
5. Council has put forward a nomina-
tion for the Richard St Barbe Baker 
Foundation's third Man of the Trees 
Award. Our President was invited to be 
part of the nominating committee. 
6. The topic of professional registra-
tion has been under consideration. 
7. The financial state of the Institute 
has been of concern and efforts have 
been made to remind those with late sub-
scriptions, to sell more handbooks and 
to trim costs. 
8. Council has also been involved with 
matters relating to consultants, mem-
bership, the journal and general admin-
istration. 
Preparation for NZIF 1988 Conference/AGM 
is progressing well 
Planning for the New Zealand Institute of Foresters 1988 Conference and 
AGM is well under way. The conference, to be held at the THC Chateau, 
Tongariro, from 11th-15th May, has the theme "National Lands - Mecha-
nisms of Management" . 
The technical sessions of the conference address issues and conflicts 
involving land-use planning, user pays philosophy and the approach and 
attitudes being adopted by the newly-created corporations and depart-
ments to the management of public lands. 
Full programme details and registration form will be sent to all members. 
Plan now to attend. 
For enquiries contact: 
Dr David Rook, 
C/- Forest Research Institute, 
Private Bag, 
Rotorua. 
TX NZ 21080 
FAX (073) 479 380 
Ph (073) 475 899 
NZ Forest Service 
The NZIF has been the recipient of 
approximately $6000 from the residual 
funds of the various social and other 
groups within the Forest Service. These 
funds will be utilized by the Institute to 
set up an annual award for outstanding 
contributions to practical forestry to 
commemorate the record of the NZ 
Forest Service in training competent 
forest managers. 
A small committee will be working on 
the rules and reporting back to Council. 
It is envisaged that local sections will be 
responsible for nominations from their 
region. Suggestions on the name and 
conditions will be welcomed by Lindsay 




NZ Institue of Foresters has received, 
through the Royal Society, a silver and 
horn flask presented to Thomas Kirk by 
Captain Campbell Walker earlier this 
century. No doubt the flask was carried 
and well used by Kirk on many of the 
botanical expeditions that have led to 
him being so closely associated with the 
flora of New Zealand. 
Kirk's outstanding work on, and 
knowledge of the forest botany of New 
Zealand is recognized in plant names 
and publications. The Institute, through 
the availability of the flask and a small 
associated sum of money, now has an 
opportunity to both recognize Kirk's 
work and promote similar levels .of 
endeavour in the wider forestry field. 
Council of the Institute have agreed to 
use the flask and money as the basis for 
an award to be made in alternate years, 
the Thomas Kirk Award. It is to recog-
nize outstanding contributions to Fore-
stry (in the widest sense) and would con-
sist of the Kirk Horn Flask (held for a 
month) and a medal to be retained by the 
winner. 
The Institute have examined the costs 
of manufacturing dies and casting 
medals for this prestigious award and 
find that the cost is quite substantial. We 
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